The grammar of denial: state, society, and Turkish–Armenian relations by Bayraktar, Seyhan








The grammar of denial: state, society, and Turkish–Armenian relations
Bayraktar, Seyhan
Abstract: The existing literature on the denial of the Armenian Genocide of 1915 tends to concentrate
on either the Turkish state’s political practices or civil society’s increasing openness to alternative read-
ings of the event. I argue that both approaches reduce denialism to the political practices and defense
mechanisms of Turkey by prioritizing the state as the sole agent of genocide denial. Although the state
is indeed a dominant actor of denialism, to juxtapose state and society is to overlook the power that
rests<jats:italic>in the discourse itself</jats:italic>and its pervasiveness across different—at times even
competing—social and political settings.
DOI: https://doi.org/10.1017/s0020743815001014





Bayraktar, Seyhan (2015). The grammar of denial: state, society, and Turkish–Armenian relations.
International Journal of Middle East Studies, 47(4):801-806.
DOI: https://doi.org/10.1017/s0020743815001014
Roundtable 801
The Grammar of Denial: State, Society, and Turkish–Armenian
Relations
SEYHAN BAYRAKTAR
History Department, University of Zurich, Zurich, Switzerland;
e-mail: seyhan.bayraktar@foeg.uzh.ch
doi:10.1017/S0020743815001014
The existing literature on the denial of the Armenian Genocide of 1915 tends to concen-
trate on either the Turkish state’s political practices or civil society’s increasing openness
to alternative readings of the event. I argue that both approaches reduce denialism to the
political practices and defense mechanisms of Turkey by prioritizing the state as the sole
agent of genocide denial. Although the state is indeed a dominant actor of denialism,
to juxtapose state and society is to overlook the power that rests in the discourse itself
and its pervasiveness across different—at times even competing—social and political
settings.
Recent literature conveys how short sighted it is to attribute denial only to the Turk-
ish state. The fact that descendants of former perpetrators have vivid memories of
Armenians being killed by their ancestors has led some to conclude that the “Turk-
ish government is denying a genocide that its own population [in contrast] remem-
bers.”1 Such an equation between social memory and genocide acknowledgement is
problematic, however, as is the tendency in recent literature to evaluate the current
memory boom about the Armenian Genocide as an indicator of a critical discourse
per se. Hence, the debate surrounding the denial of the Armenian Genocide tends to
neglect the contestedness of the concept of genocide in political discourse and under-
mines the importance of the victims’ almost century-long political struggle for genocide
acknowledgement.2
My own research on the discourse in Turkey surrounding the Armenian Genocide
during “critical discourse moments”3 between 1973 and 2005 has shown that increased
critical discourse does not indicate a paradigmatic shift toward self-critical discourse in
which the needs of the victims have priority over national identity.4 On the contrary, the
denial produced by the state and its agencies in the 1970s and 1980s has become much
more sophisticated. While the state has adopted new strategies to block international
genocide acknowledgements (e.g., proposing a Turkish–Armenian history commission,
announcing the restoration of Armenian cultural artifacts, and football diplomacy),
discourse frames invented for political purposes in the 1970s and 1980s (i.e., “Armenian
terrorism”) have proven particularly pervasive. Indeed, not only have they survived over
time, but they have also reached an increasingly wide range of social and political
actors.
I will elaborate my argument that the denial of the Armenian Genocide has taken
a sophisticated turn that determines the boundaries of Turkish–Armenian encounters
by giving a brief overview of the different stages of denial and of the structures
and key patterns in public and political memory that have dominated the debate on
the genocide topic. Most importantly, I will link the discourse to the material con-
text of Turkey’s foreign relations, particularly with the European Union (EU) in the
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early 2000s when the pressure to address the genocidal past reached an unprecedented
peak.
Before doing this, however, I want to clarify some key assumptions of my approach.
In studying genocide denial I adopt the poststructuralist position that discourses—
memory patterns about the Armenian Genocide in Turkish society and politics—are not
epiphenomena in politics but are themselves key in the production and reproduction
of power structures. Access to discourse and the control and selection of discursive
patterns both stem from and result in power relations.5 However, following Ole Waever,
I soften the understanding of the relationship between discourse and actors as defined in
poststructuralist discourse analysis.6 While the latter assumes that discourses are prior
to actors in the sense that subjects do not exist outside discourse, the present study
conceptualizes discursive structures as in-between actors who produce, reproduce, or
transform them through practice. For the study of the denial of the Armenian Genocide,
this means that existing discourse frames about the Armenian Genocide (regardless
of their origin) and Turkey’s politics of the past together (a) determine the range of
possibilities of how to frame the destruction of the Armenians and (b) at the same time
are themselves dependent on actors. It is this kind of “linguistic structuration” that allows
discourses to change.7
Prior to the turn of the millennium—though particularly in the 1970s and 1980s—
remembrance of the 1915 genocide occurred almost exclusively as a reaction to external
triggers in the form of political pressure. The memory politics of diaspora Armenians
(whether militant attacks on Turkish state representatives or political mobilization for
recognition of the genocide, particularly in the United States) and international genocide
recognition debates not only raised awareness about the genocide worldwide but also
made it impossible for Turkey to avoid the topic. Consequently, this phase of Turkish
denial is marked by its reactive rather than proactive character.
Two frames played a dominant role in this phase of denialism: first, “Armenian ter-
rorism” became the decisive and only explanation for Armenian attacks on Turkish
representatives; second, attempts at distinguishing between Armenians in Turkey—“our
Armenians”—and “revengeful” Armenians in the diaspora were visible. The need to ex-
plicitly differentiate between “our Armenians” and “diaspora Armenians” in the Turkish
print media in the 1970s was accompanied by calls to stay cool and not incite another
6–7 September 1955, when state-orchestrated riots in Istanbul targeted the Greek and
the non-Muslim population, respectively. In this early phase of the discourse, political
encounters between Turks and Armenians in Turkey’s public space were nonexistent.
Because of its highly vulnerable position, the Armenian community of Turkey remained
unseen and did not actively take part in the discourse about its own historical expe-
rience and destruction. Instead, the patriarch represented the community in the public
arena and, in the instances when Turkish diplomats were killed by Armenians, offered
his condolences in its name. This pattern of Turkish–Armenian relations in Turkey,
where Armenians were invisible in the public arena, only began to crack around the
year 2000.
In the 1980s, denial was institutionalized and professionalized: a special agency called
Istihbarat ve Arastirma Müdürlügü (Directorate General of Intelligence and Research)
was founded within the Foreign Ministry to coordinate all issues related to the Armenian
Genocide and to formulate the state’s politics of the past.8 One of the most effective
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strategies of this agency was to frame the “Armenian question” as a problem of contem-
porary terrorism rather than an outcome of Turkey’s genocidal past and the absence of
justice and restitution.
This strategy of genocide denial proved successful insofar as “Armenian terrorism”
survived the period of the 1970s and 1980s when assassinations were actually taking
place. More importantly, the frame of Armenian terrorism gained legitimacy over time,
since it is invoked not only by state actors and nationalists but also by critical voices
promoting Turkish–Armenian dialogue. The following example is highly illustrative,
for it shows not only the uncritical use of the frame in the context of Turkish–Armenian
relations, but also its apparent acceptability far beyond Turkish state and nationalist
circles: as Turkish public intellectuals organized the “Apology Campaign” in 2008,
nationalists organized a countercampaign demanding an apology from Armenians.9
Such a reaction—though reversing the perpetrator–victim relationship and confusing
historical cause–effect processes—was relatively unsurprising to anyone following the
highly tense issue of genocide in Turkey. One of the main organizers of the “Apology
Campaign,” the well-known public intellectual Baskın Oran, also argued in favor of
a public apology by Armenians for the crimes of the Armenian Secret Army of the
Liberation of Armenia (ASALA).10 Oran reasoned that such an apology would have
an immense effect on the growing critical awareness in Turkey about the genocide
and would contribute to Turkish-Armenian reconciliation. Thus, he equated the need
for Turkey to come to terms with the Armenian Genocide, a foundational event in the
creation of modern Turkey, with Armenians’ coming to terms with the violence of a
terrorist organization. The equation of different instances of violence involves the risk
of them justifying one another. In the case of the Armenian Genocide, such an equation
is but another indicator of how even the most progressive Turkish actors use the state-
invented denial frame of “Armenian terrorism” without taking into account Turkey’s lack
of any constructive politics of the past and the lasting effects of the genocidal process
on Armenians.
The years 2000–2002 were a period of transition during which the “Armenian is-
sue” gradually became part of everyday political debate in Turkey. The main differ-
ence between this stage of denial and the previous one was that the destruction of
the Armenians—as well as that of other groups in the Ottoman Empire, such as the
Assyrians—was increasingly dealt with independently of specific and concrete external
triggers. In this phase Turkey also began to revise its politics of the past, for its con-
ventional approach to the problem, centered on security and terrorism, had not halted
international recognition of the genocide. France’s genocide resolution in 2001 led
Turkey to rethink its politics vis-à-vis the Republic of Armenia. After having practiced
a politics of putting pressure on Armenia by isolating it, Ankara started a cautious rap-
prochement by encouraging low-profile contacts on the level of civil society and easing
visa regulations for citizens of the Republic of Armenia. In so doing, Turkey aimed at
bypassing the political efforts of the Armenian diaspora. However, neither the politics of
isolation nor the politics of rapprochement produced the results that Turkey sought: they
did not prevent further genocide acknowledgements or halt the Republic of Armenia
from advocating for such acknowledgements.
The phase in which the Armenian Genocide became part of everyday political com-
munication in Turkey reached a preliminary peak in 2005, which was both the ninetieth
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anniversary of the genocide as well as the most critical year in Turkey’s EU accession
process—when the EU would decide whether to start accession talks with Turkey. After
Turkey had become an official EU candidate in 1999, an intense debate started in some
EU member states, first and foremost France and Germany, over the cultural European-
ability of Turkey. In the context of this debate, Turkey’s problematic relationship with
the genocide was crucial for critics convinced that the country was not European enough.
On the institutional level, the European Parliament, which approves the membership of
candidate countries, reconfirmed its genocide resolution from 1987 at critical junctures,
such as in 2000, 2002, and 2005, thereby maintaining high pressure on Turkey. Hence,
between 1999 and 2005 acknowledgement of the Armenian Genocide or self-critical
reflection on the past became informal criteria for Turkey’s EU entry.
Against the backdrop of profuse discussion of the Armenian Genocide in European
countries, the Turkish government made tactical concessions to counter the international
pressure.11 A few weeks before the ninetieth anniversary of the genocide, Prime Minister
Erdogan contacted Armenian President Kocharian, suggesting a joint Armenian-Turkish
history commission. The government also announced the restoration of Armenian cul-
tural and religious monuments. The renovation of the Holy Cross Church in Lake Van,
for example, was announced as a step both to improve Armenian–Turkish relations
and to counter international genocide acknowledgements.12 With these policy initiatives
Turkey achieved two things: it signalled openness in terms of the contested history of
1915; and, at the same time, it depoliticized the issue by delegating it to so-called “ex-
perts”. This new strategy was applauded internationally. The Independent Commission
on Turkey, for example, a group of high-ranking EU politicians, welcomed Turkey’s
move while criticizing Armenia for not responding positively to it.
The signs of an opening were further fueled by breaking news in 2005: three of
Turkey’s most renowned universities announced the organization of an “alternative Ar-
menian conference” that would step outside the confines of the Turkish nationalist
narrative on the Armenian Genocide. Within a few days the organizers—representing
the established Turkish academia—met with major opposition and political pressure. In
a parliamentary speech the justice minister Cemil Ciçek accused them of “backstabbing
the nation.” As a consequence, the hosting university decided to postpone the conference.
The second attempt at realizing the conference also encountered major obstacles when a
court decided to halt it. This time, however, the same justice minister who had criticized
the conference as a traitorous project provided the necessary clue for how to circumvent
the court’s decision, namely by changing the location of the conference. Other leading
members of the government, such as Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdoğan and Foreign
Minister Abdullah Gül, also spoke in favor of the conference. Behind the scenes the gov-
ernment pushed for its realization before the EU summit in October 2005, where the EU
would decide whether to start formal accession talks with Turkey. With this backing of the
government, the conference finally took place on 24–25 September 2005. The timing of
the conference is already a solid indicator that it served Turkey’s interests and its EU bid.
However, in their public statements, the organizers of the conference also stressed
exactly the same point: that the conference would ultimately serve Turkey and “be one
of the most significant steps taken in our country on the path . . . toward democracy.”13
In a joint declaration they stressed that the “demonstration of how Turkey actually
contains . . . a rich multiplicity of thoughts would be . . . to the utmost benefit of
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Turkey.”14 Hence, the organizers and supporters of the conference not only strongly
rejected the accusation that they were traitors and harming Turkey, they also reversed
it. Ali Bayramoglu, who was among the vocal supporters of the conference in 2005 and
one of the four initiators of the Apology Campaign in 2008, pointed to the political
damage that the cancellation of the conference had caused, particularly in the light of
Turkey–EU relations, and asked, “who is the [real] traitor” here?15
In this sense, the counterdiscourse of Turkish progressives itself relied on a strongly
nationalist logic and rhetoric. These vocal actors surrounding the conference did not
challenge the need to come to terms with the past as such and beyond the question of its
possible benefits for Turkey. Such shortcomings of the 2005 controversy over the “al-
ternative Armenian conference” and the denial of the Armenian Genocide, respectively,
have been largely ignored so far. Instead, the conference is predominantly referred as a
pathbreaking moment in Turkish–Armenian relations and in the coming to terms process
of Turkey in particular.
Meanwhile, since 2005 Turkish–Armenian encounters have considerably intensified
on a variety of levels. We have witnessed an interim, tension-fraught rapprochement
between the two states (soccer diplomacy, Turkish–Armenian protocols, etc.) as well as
numerous encounters between Turks and Armenians from Turkey and from the diaspora.
On the occasion of the one hundredth anniversary of the genocide in April 2005, a
remarkable number of diaspora Armenians, together with public intellectuals, human
rights activists, and civil societal organizations from Turkey, chose to commemorate the
genocide at different sites in Turkey. These joint memory efforts and the unprecedented
wave of public commemoration of the genocide within Turkey carried particularly strong
symbolic vibes, suggesting a new quality in Turkish–Armenian civil societal relations.
Paradoxically enough, although such encounters are important, they do not necessarily
signify a meaningful confrontation with the past on the part of the successors of the
perpetrators.16 Turkey’s rhetoric around the time of the centennial became, if anything,
more extreme in its negationism. Yet the form, content, and messages surrounding
various commemorations revealed how difficult it is to confront the sophistication of
denial and pave the way for reconciliation that addresses critical issues such as justice
and restitution.
Therefore, it remains to be seen to what extent these encounters between Turks and Ar-
menians from the Diaspora are based on the same language and a common understanding
of the historical—and ultimately contemporary—dynamics of Turkish–Armenian rela-
tions. Taking into consideration that the 2005 “alternative Armenian conference” has
never been questioned in terms of its assumed breaking effects—least of all by the or-
ganizing academics and their supporters—it seems that Turkish–Armenian encounters,
dialogue, and reconciliation are but a black box. Once opened, this box will likely re-
veal that the feel-good, symbolic vibes of such encounters have overshadowed the fact
that genocide denial has adjusted well to memory, commemoration, and the vision of
Armenian–Turkish civil societal coresistance to such denial.
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